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Abstract
Inspired by a question that Einstein had asked him, Piaget analyzed
the child’s conception of time with a series of experiments that were pub-
lished in book form in 1946. I briefly recapitulate Piaget’s analysis as
an interpretation of the conception of absolute time in classical physics.
Piaget’s suggestions as to how the analysis would carry over to a genetic
understanding of time in the special theory of relativity are reviewed. In
light of Piaget’s work, some observations are made about Einstein’s 1905
paper on the ‘Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies.’ The specific trans-
formational operations that mediate between the viewpoints of different
inertial observers are characterized as a basis for the cognitive restructur-
ing of spatio-temporal concepts in the relativistic context.
1 Introduction
At various occasions, Piaget reminisced that it was Einstein who inspired him
to study the genesis of temporal concepts.1 The foreword to his 1946 study on
“the child’s conception of time”2 begins like this:
This work was prompted by a number of questions kindly suggested
by Albert Einstein more than fifteen years ago, when he presided
over the first international course of lectures on philosophy and psy-
chology at Davos. (Piaget, 1969, ix)
Unfortunately, we do not have independent documentation of Einstein’s sugges-
tions. But Piaget continues to specify the proposed research with the following
questions:
Is our intuitive grasp of time primitive or derived? Is it identical with
our intuitive grasp of velocity? What if any bearing do these ques-
tions have on the genesis and development of the child’s conception
of time? (ibid.)
∗To appear in: Culture and Cognition: Essays in honor of Peter Damerow. Ju¨rgen Renn
and Matthias Schemmel (eds.). Edition Open Access, Berlin.
1See, e.g., (Piaget, 1946, v), (Piaget, 1950, 45), (Piaget, 1957, 54).
2(Piaget, 1946), English translation in (Piaget, 1969).
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Piaget goes on to tell us that after Einstein’s inspiring question, he devoted
every year some investigation to these issues but initially he had no hope of
finding out anything since the “time relationships constructed by young chil-
dren are so largely based on what they hear from adults and not on their own
experiences.” It was only after the investigations on the child’s conceptions of
number and quantity that he found a way to disentangle the various aspects
of the concept of time and to dissociate its specific content from the notions of
space and motion.
In Peter Damerow’s and Wolfgang Lefe`vre’s research colloquium on “prob-
lems of conceptual development in the history of the natural sciences,” we stud-
ied, for several months in the fall of 1985, Piaget’s work. We read, in particular,
his investigations on the genetic conception of time. Peter criticized Piaget’s
“concept of reflective abstraction” because of its implication that “the material
means of the actions on which cognitive activity is based are irrelevant for the
development of cognitive abilities” (Damerow, 1996, p. 9). Nevertheless, Peter
tried to convince us that Piaget’s analysis of the concept of time carries sig-
nificance and provides insight also for a historiography of temporal concepts.
Those discussions with Peter proved to be one of the formative moments in my
intellectual biography. In this contribution, I want to take a look again at Pi-
aget’s analysis of the concept of time and make a few comments on the question
as to how his analysis may carry over to the conceptual context of the special
theory of relativity.
2 Piaget’s analysis of classical temporal concepts
The core of Piaget’s investigation is one particular experiment, which I will dis-
cuss in more detail below. It was designed against the background of Piaget’s
tenet of the specific characteristic of the concept of time. To begin with, Pi-
aget pointed out that temporal judgments are actually not distinct from spatial
judgments, as long as only one kind of motion is considered. In various exper-
iments, Piaget demonstrated that correspondingly with young children of the
pre-operational stage temporal judgments of ‘earlier’ and ‘later,’ or comparisons
of time spans as ‘shorter’ and ‘longer,’ are based only on spatial seriation. An
object moving from left to right is first at point A and then at point B if and
only if A is left of B. Similarly, the time a body needs to go from point A to B
is longer than the time it needs to go from C to D if and only if the distance
between A and B is larger than the distance between C and D. Children will
find out that things get more complicated if non-uniform motion is involved,
but structurally temporal concepts are not distinguished from spatial concepts
as long as only one kind of independent motion is considered.
When two different motions have to be compared, the initial reliance on
basing temporal judgments on spatial features perseveres. There is a correspon-
dence here between the child’s concept of speed and the Aristotelian concept of
velocity as the finite distance traversed in a finite amount of time. Judgments
of comparison between different velocities are based on various proportionalities
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Figure 1: In one of his experiments reported in (Piaget, 1946), a colored liquid
is flowing from one bottle into another one through a valve. Children are shown
the process and asked to mark successive water levels on prepared sheets of
paper. They are then asked to reconstruct the sequence of sketches after the
individual sheets were cut in half along the valve.
that follow from the Aristotelian concept. One body moves faster than another
one, if it traverses a longer distance in the same amount of time. It is also faster
if it traverses the same distance in a smaller amount of time. A composition
of both proportionalities can lead to contradictions if the conditions of equal
time or equal distance are violated. Thus, if two bodies start moving at the
same time from point A and one body arrives at B a little later than the other
body arrives at C, but B is farther away from A than C, the first body is either
moving faster since it traverses a larger distance or slower since it arrives later
at its terminal point.
It is only when different motions have to be judged which are largely causally
independent but have to be coordinated at specific points of simultaneity that
the specific concept of time needs to be invoked. In order to demonstrate that it
is this coordination of different motions that constitutes the conception of time
and to isolate its specific deductive capacity, Piaget devised his experiment (see
Fig. 1).
Two bottle-like vessels of different shape, one pear-shaped, the other of cylin-
drical form, are connected in such a way that a colored liquid would flow down-
wards from one bottle into the other through a valve that could be opened
and closed. The experimenter would then let children observe a demonstration
where the entire liquid is initially in the upper vessel and then is let to flow
down into the lower vessel, in certain discrete amounts. The children would get
a number of prepared papers showing the two empty vessels and were asked
to draw the water levels in each vessel into their papers at each stage of the
process. Thus, at the conclusion of the demonstration, when the liquid was
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entirely contained in the lower vessel, the children had created a series of half
a dozen or so drawings of the two bottles with different water levels in each.
The drawings were then shuffled and the children were asked to put them back
into order again according to a temporal sequence. In a second part of the
experiment, the drawings were then cut in the middle in such a way that the
two halves would show the upper or the lower vessel, respectively. Again, the
drawings were shuffled, and the children were asked to reconstruct the original
sequence.
Piaget’s observation was that very young children were not able at all to
reconstruct the original sequence even in the first part of the experiment with
the intact drawings. Older children were able to put the uncut drawings in
the correct sequence but failed to reconstruct the correct sequence when the
drawings had been cut apart. Typically, what would happen is that random
pairs of images of the upper bottle and images of the lower bottle would be
formed and children at this stage would construct a sequence based on either
the lower half or the upper part but with the randomly formed pairs kept intact.
Thus, the water level in the reconstructed sequence would correctly rise in the
lower vessel but the upper portion would show a random or wrong sequence, or
vice versa. Only at the final stage were the children able to break up pairs at
will and construct two coordinated sequences of rising water level in the lower
bottle and sinking water level in the upper bottle, put together in such a way
that the lowest level in the lower bottle would correspond to the highest level
in the upper bottle.
Several features of Piaget’s experiment are worth pointing out. First, it
does not matter how much time actually passes during the experiment. Since
the valve is opened and closed by the experimenter at will, more or less physi-
cal time passes between subsequent stages of the experiment. The experiment
thus exemplifies Piaget’s conviction that time is a cognitive construct, a de-
ductive scheme, not an intuition or form of sensibility. Second, the ability of
reconstructing the correct sequence of images depends crucially on the mental
ability to reverse and to anticipate the actual physical process. Whereas the
actual flow of time and the causal processes are irreversibel, the conception of
time is dependent on the mental capacity to reverse, anticipate, and interpolate
causal processes. In a process of decentration, children construct a uniform,
homogeneous time that allows a coordination of different sequences of events.
Piaget captured his understanding of the concept of time as a co-seriation
of different sequences of physical events in an intuitive graphical representation
(see Fig. 2). A sequence of events, or a motion, is characterized by points
O1, A1, etc. that follow each other in a relation of earlier and later in some
causally determined way. They are coordinated with other sequences of events,
or motions, Oi, Ai, etc. such that O1, O2, O3 etc. are put into a relation of
simultaneity. Uniform time is not bound to any one specific sequence of events or
motion but it arises from the coordinating operations as a cognitive construction
that allows the co-seriation of the different sequences of events Ai, Bi, etc. and
the different time spans a, a′, b, etc.
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CONCLUSIONS 
Many authors distinguish between empirically discovered 
simultaneity and simultaneity that is deduced (or constructed) 
from succession or duration. M. Jean de La Harpe, in particular, 
has made much of this distinction, which nevertheless strikes us 
as resting on shaky psychological and axiomatic foundations: 1 
simultaneity in both cases, is simply a limiting case of succession, 
in the sense of (2a) (proposition 2 only holds for one and the 
same point in space) and hence necessarily partakes of the nature 
of a construction, so that the difference is one of degree only. 
lb. Once the simultaneity of two events is given, the complete 
grouping of successions does not appear in the additive form (1), 
but in the following multiplicative form (co-seriation) : 
a a' b' e' 
01 -* A1 -* B1 -* C1 -* ... 
to to to to 
a a' b' c' 
(3) 02 -* A2 -* B2 -* C2 -* ... 
to to to to 
a a b' c' 
0 3 -* A 3 -* B 3 -* C3 -* ... 
1 J. de La Harpe, Genese et mesure du temps, Neuchatel, 1941, pp. 115 and 
123. According to this author, 'quantitative' simultaneity is invariably 
constructed, whereas 'simple simultaneity is established by postulate': 
'Two events are simultaneous if they are seized by a single act of awareness, 
though they remain completely distinct' (Postulate I), but 'two events 
are successive if they are seized by separate though closely linked acts of 
awareness' (Postulate II). Now, three objections can be raised against this 
formulation: (I) There is no way of distinguishing 'separate though closely 
linked acts of awareness' from 'a single act of awareness' bearing on 
'distinct' events, and we might equally well argue that every assertion (un-
like perception) that two events are successive constitutes a single 'state of 
awareness', and that, conversely, every assertion that two events are 
simultaneous involves two distinct acts of awareness. (2) What precisely 
are these 'acts of awareness'? If they are judgements, we are back with (1); 
if they are perceptions they have no general application to the problem of 
simultaneity (cf. Chapter IV §4). (3) In general, M. de La Harpe's axiomatic 
system treats as 'postulates', all the psychological constructions of time 
and thus introduces an irreducible dualism between postulates and 
theorems. From the purely psychological point of view, moreover, each of 
his postulates embraces a singularly complex process of constructions (as 
this whole book has tried to show). Now, it is the operations involved in 
these constructions which, we believe, are in need of axiomatization (cf. 
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i.e. in the form of several series of successions with simultaneous 
moments. The multiplicative form of this grouping does not 
moreover imply that time has two (or more) dimensions: since 
the vertical dimension (simultaneities) is zero, the non-dimen-
sional nature of temporal successions is fully maintained (which, 
incidentally, is in full accord with the topological theory of 
dimensions). 
II. Let us now look at the qualitative operations involved in 
the grouping of durations. As we saw, children succeed in this 
field even before they are capable of constructing quantitative 
time. Now, if two instantaneous moments A and B are succes-
sive, they must needs be separated by a duration and, unlike the 
order of succession which is asymmetrical (if B comes after A 
then A comes before B), duration appears logically as the inter-
val between two successive terms and consequently as a sym-
metrical relation: the duration (interval) AB is identical with the 
duration (interval) BA, and any event occurring between A and 
B must necessarily occur between B and A as well. 1 In other 
words, the interval is independent of the order of events or of its 
mental reconstruction. 
It is therefore quite simple to formulate the grouping of dura-
to do so we must simply correlate the seriation of asym-
m trical relations (successions) with the addition of symmetrical 
re ations (intervals). The legitimacy of this procedure has been 
established elsewhere. 2 If 0 +--t I A is the interval between 0 and 
A (exclusively) we have 
1 When this interval tends towards zero, we have simultaneity, which is 
therefore still a limiting case. 
2 See our Classes, relations et nombres, Essai sur les groupements de Ia 
logistique et Ia reversibilite de Ia pensee. Paris (Vrin), 1942, Chapter VII, 
p. 120. 
our Axiomatique des operations constitutives du temps, C. R. des seances 
de Ia Soc. de physique de Geneve, Vol. 58, 1941, p. 24). If we examine the 
logical structure of the operations themselves, instead of merely axioma-
tizing their results, we cannot agree with M. de La Harpe that, with the 
advent of relativity theory, 'simple and quantitative simultaneity have 
become completely divorced' (p. 149). In fact, Einstein's demonstration 
that simultaneity and velocity are indissolubly linked together, applies to 
perceptive motions no less than to the rest. 
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Figure 2: Piaget’s graphical illustration of his concept of co-seriation (Piaget,
1969, 264).
3 Piaget on the concept of time in r lativity
Piaget’s concept of time as a cognitive ability of co-seriation is a convincing
analysis of the concept of “absolute time” of class cal me ha ics. Its genesis in
the development of children illustrates Piaget’s idea that cognitive development
proceeds along stages of ever more far-reaching decentration which in turn result
from ever increasing capacities of transformational operations. In his 1946 book,
Piaget concluded his analysis with an outlook on the question of how his an ly is
would carry over to the problem of understanding time in the special theory of
relativity.
It remains frustratingly unclear how Piaget would have applied his analysis
t the genetic explanation of special rela ivity. In fact, th few remarks th t
he gives in his 1946 book are altogether too vague as to allow us even to assess
whether Piaget fully understood the difference between temporal conceptions
implied by the special theory of relativity and those of classical Newtonian
mechanics.
In special relativity, there is no universal time. But Piaget, when he talks
about Kant, says:
As Kant has shown so clearly, time and space are not concepts but
unique ‘schemes’—there is only one time and one space in the entire
universe. (Piaget, 1969, 33)
Are we supposed to read the assertion of the unique existence of one and only
one universal time as restricted to Kant, or would Piaget approve of this as-
sertion in general? At other places, he talks about the ‘relative time’ (p. 396)
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but also about the ‘time of relativity theory.’ Indeed the final passages of the
book pertain explicitly to the theory of special relativity and show the same
ambivalence and ambiguity. Piaget wrote:
As for the time of relativity theory, far from being an exception to
this general rule, it involves the co-ordination of motions and their
velocities even more clearly than the rest. (Piaget, 1969, 278f)
So far, so good, and one would be tempted to agree with Piaget on this general
level, if suspicions would not have been raised by the unqualified use of the term
‘time of relativity theory.’ In relativity theory, there is no such thing as ‘the
time,’ but, of course, Piaget could have meant the ‘concept of time’ in relativity
theory. But what follows immediately afterwards carries the same ambivalence.
He goes on to say:
Let us recall first of all that relativity theory never reverses the
order of events in terms of the observer’s viewpoint: if A precedes
B when considered from a certain point of view, it can never follow
B when considered from a different standpoint, but will at most be
simultaneous with it. (Piaget, 1969, 279)3
How should we interpret Piaget here? Apparently A and B would be two events.
Let’s coordinatize them in some frame of reference F as A = (x, y, z, t) and B =
(x′, y′, z′, t′) (see Fig. 3). Here x, y, z, and x′, y′, z′ denote spatial coordinates,
t and t′ denote the time coordinate (in the following, we will suppress the
irrelevant y- and z-coordinates). To say that A happens before B, then would
mean that t < t′ or t′ − t > 0. In Fig. 3, horizontal red lines denote events
with the same t or t′, respectively, i.e. events on the same horizontal red line
are simultaneous in F . Clearly, with respect to the red lines of simultaneity,
A precedes B. Now let’s look at the two events from a frame of reference Φ
moving with respect to F with velocity v along the x-direction. In Φ, we have
A = (ξ, τ) and B = (ξ′, τ ′), and in Φ the temporal difference between the two
events is τ ′−τ . But if we interpret Piaget’s phrase ‘from a certain point of view’
as ‘in a certain frame of reference,’ his claim is wrong. To see this, consider the
Lorentz transformations that allow us to go from F to Φ:
ξ =
x− vt√
1− v2c2
; τ =
t− vc2x√
1− v2c2
. (1)
3The vagueness is not an artifact of the translation; in the original French, the passage
reads: “Rappelons d’abord que, en aucun cas, il n’aboutit a` inverser l’ordre des phe´nome`nes
en fonction des points des vue: si A est ante`rieur a` B, d’un certain point de vue, il ne sera
jamais ulte`rieur a` B, d’un autre point de vue, mais tout au plus simultane´.” (Piaget, 1946,
298).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the relativity of simultaneity of two spacelike separated
events A and B in a spacetime diagram. In the red coordinate system (x, ct)
horizontal lines parallel to the x-axis represent (hyper)surfaces of simultaneous
events, and in this coordinates A precedes B. But for an observer moving
rapidly along the x-direction, the blue coordinate system (ξ, cτ) is used and
the tilted lines parallel to the ξ-axis represent (hyper)surfaces of simultaneous
events. In the blue frame of reference, the event B precedes A. However, for
events B′ in the timelike future of A, the event A precedes B′ in all possible
frames of reference.
7
We then get
τ ′ − τ = t
′ − vc2x′√
1− v2c2
− t−
v
c2x√
1− v2c2
;
=
1√
1− v2c2
(
t′ − t− v
c2
(x′ − x)
)
. (2)
Clearly, we can have τ ′ − τ < 0 or τ ′ < τ , i.e. a reversal in the temporal order
of the two events in Φ, if
t′ − t < v
c2
(x′ − x). (3)
In Fig. 3, blue lines parallel to the ξ-axis denote events with the same τ or τ ′,
respectively, i.e. events on the same (tilted) blue line are simultaneous in Φ.
One sees that, with respect to the blue lines of simultaneity, B precedes A.
That is to say, if the two events A and B are sufficiently far away from each
other spatially in F , then an observer dashing by along their line of connection
with a speed v > c2∆t/∆x would see the two events in reverse order. And
if ∆x, the spatial distance of A and B as measured in F , is sufficiently large,
there will be no problem in satisfying that condition. What we have shown is
simply the well-known tenet that for any two events A and B whose separation
is spacelike (the shaded region in Fig. 3), i.e. for which
(x′ − x)2 + (y′ − y)2 + (z′ − z)2 − c2(t′ − t)2 > 0, (4)
the temporal order is undefined and depends on the state of motion of the
observer.
Piaget’s formulation is vague enough to allow for different, and correct, in-
terpretations. After all, we are talking only about the final paragraph of an
entire book. He could have meant two events happening along the world line
of a material particle, or in other words, he could have meant that two events
might be causally connectable in the sense that their separation is timelike.
In fact, it seems that we may indeed have been too critical in our read-
ing of the above passage. Four years later, Piaget incorporated the results of
his 1946 book on the genesis of the conception of time into his 1950 Introduc-
tion a` l’E´piste´mologie Ge´ne´tique, in its second volume dealing with La Pense´e
Physique. There, we find the same statement again in chapter IV, section 3 on
“the temporal operation” in paragraph V, entitled “The relativistic metric.”
In this paragraph, Piaget first claims that quite generally his analysis of
the (classical) conception of (absolute) time as supervenient on the concept of
velocity suggests the naturalness of the relativity revolution. That is because
“[...] all modifications of our ideas about velocity imply a transformation of our
conception of time” (Piaget, 1950, 44).4 Since in the development of physics,
the velocity of light had emerged as a limiting speed that cannot be surpassed
by propagation of any causally efficacious signal, it followed with necessity that
4English translations from (Piaget, 1950) are my own, TS.
8
both the concept of velocity and the notion of time were subject to joint modi-
fication according to the genetic viewpoint:
As soon as Michelson’s and Morley’s measurements had verified the
special character of the speed of light and its complete isotropy, the
genetic conception, which connects the idea of time with that of ve-
locity, required a simultaneous modification of these two concepts.
This revision of the physical concepts as a function of ideas about
time and velocity was carried out by Einstein with well-known suc-
cess. (Piaget, 1950, 45)
The modification required by the axiom of the limiting value of the speed of light
pertains immediately to the concept of simultaneity. If there is a maximal limit
velocity, it follows that the simultaneity of distant events is no longer absolute
but relative to the velocity of an observer, just as children will deny that two
lights are switched on simultaneously, if the lights are some meters apart and the
children cannot see them at the same time (Piaget, 1969, 110–115). It is only
for spatially neighboring events that a concept of simultaneity survives, and it is
here that we find the incriminated sentence again, embedded in a context which
makes it clear that Piaget is thinking about “neighboring events,” i.e. events
which are spatially close together.
Since the simultaneity of events at neighboring [my emphasis, TS]
places [...] is not changed, the same is true for the temporal sequence.
(Piaget, 1950, 47)
and the sentence of the invariance of temporal sequence that we criticized above
follows immediately after this qualification.
Nevertheless, Piaget offers us only analogies when it comes to the genetic
explanation of relativity:
On the other hand, this concept of relativity of duration requires
an effort of coordination in order to equilibrate the viewpoints of
observers moving with different velocity. This effort is only a con-
tinuation of the effort of coordination that the child has to master
in order to comprehend the heterogenous durations, which it as-
sociates with different velocities, into a unique common time. As
paradox as it may seem, the relative durations and the proper times
of Einstein’s theory relate to absolute time as absolute time to the
individual times and local times of the child’s intuition. (Piaget,
1950, 46)
That is to say, the coordination efforts that give rise to the child’s forming a
unique common time are analogous to the coordination efforts that a classi-
cally trained physicist has to master in order to overcome the limitations of the
absolute time of Newtonian mechanics. But what Piaget calls paradox here is
perhaps only a consequence, as we will see below, of the lack of a proper term
that would identify the genetic analog of absolute time in a relativistic context.
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In any case, Piaget puts the coordination of different velocities that underlies
the genesis of the concept of absolute time in perfect parallel to the coordination
of velocities that underlies the genesis of relativistic concepts:
In both cases, time appears as a coordination of velocities, and the
transition from velocities that cannot be coordinated to those that
can be coordinated, which is made possible by means of a homoge-
neous and uniform time, is a first stage of transformation from an
erroneous egocentric absoluteness into objective relations. A second
stage makes possible the transition from absolute time (and the pos-
sibility of an infinite velocity) to relative time, which is connected
with a precise coordination of velocities. (Piaget, 1950, 46)
4 Einstein and the special theory of relativity
As far as it goes, Piaget’s interpretation of the genetic basis of special relativity
provides an interesting perspective. But as it stands it is a mere program or
an abstract conceptual framework. It needs to be spelled out. Here I want to
make only a few comments.
I want to look at the locus classicus for the emergence of the special theory
of relativity, Einstein’s 1905 paper on the ‘Electrodynamics of Moving Bod-
ies’ (Einstein, 1905). What are the analogues of the experiences and efforts of
coordination that underlie the emergence of relativistic temporal and spatial
concepts? To what extent are those experiences and coordination efforts com-
parable to the ones that the child is confronted with and needs to master, and
where are they different? Does the difference in the experiential foundation of
special relativity have implications for the character of temporal concepts in the
relativistic context?
The first observation we might make is that we can read the entire § 1 of
“Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” as an elaboration of the classical, Newto-
nian time concept along the lines of Piaget’s analysis. Just in passing we may
remark that the very term “coordinate system” indicates the very coordination
efforts that may be interpreted in Piagetian terms. In § 1 Einstein expounds
the problems of the concept of distant simultaneity and defines a global time in
an inertial frame of reference by a system of clocks that are located everywhere
in space and coordinated by exchange of light signals. This system of clocks
is the idealized materialization of the uniform time that allows an operational
coordination of different motions, but only within the same inertial frame. As
Einstein concludes: “It is essential that we have defined time by means of clocks
at rest in a system at rest; because it belongs to the system at rest, we designate
the time just defined as ‘the time of the system at rest.’(Einstein, 1905, 894f).
It is only in the following sections that Einstein addresses the crucial question
of coordinating the experiences of two observers who are in a state of uniform
relative motion with each other. Very explicitly in § 2, Einstein constructs a
situation where the observer dependence of spatio-temporal judgments becomes
obvious. He looks at the task of determining the length of a moving rigid rod
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from the point of view of two observers. One observer is co-moving with the
rod. In his inertial system the rod is at rest and can be determined by physical
comparison with another rod that serves as an etalon. The other observer
determines the length of the moving rod from a coordinate system at rest, by
looking at which points in space the end points of the rod are located at some
point t of time in his coordinate system. While “the commonly used kinematics
tacitly assumes that the lengths determined by the two methods are exactly
identical” (Einstein, 1905, 894f), Einstein finds that they are, in fact, not the
same. This result raises the problem of how one can go back and forth from one
frame of reference to another one that is moving with respect to the first.
This coordination task of operationally moving between different frames of
reference is solved by finding coordinate transformations between the (orthogo-
nal Cartesian) coordinates x, y, z, t of a frame of reference K, and the coordi-
nates ξ, η, ζ, τ of a system Φ. The transformations that mediate between the
two systems of coordinates are the Lorentz transformations (1). Their form and
some of their properties were known to Einstein before, but the essential core
and content of his 1905 paper is to show how the Lorentz transformations are
justified and how they actually work in mediating the operational coordination
between moving frames of reference.
In the “kinematical part,” Einstein derives the Lorentz transformations from
the two basic principles, the principle of relativity and the speed of light pos-
tulate, and he shows that they are compatible with the assumption that all
moving observers measure the same vacuum speed of light. They also imply
the relativity of simultaneity for observers in relative motion as well as length
contraction and time dilation. He also looks at the addition of velocities and
finds that the classical law of addition of velocities is modified by the Lorentz
transformations to a new law, and one of its implications is that by composition
of velocities one can never exceed the velocity of light.
In the “electrodynamic part,” Einstein adresses the question as to how elec-
trodynamical processes are to be transformed if viewed from different frames of
references. Technically, the core result is the transformation law for the electric
and magnetic fields. It is here that the capacity of transforming back and forth
between moving frames of reference becomes fully operational. Einstein shows
that in all frames of reference, the Maxwell equations for the electromagnetic
field in vacuum hold if the fields are properly transformed. He looks at specific
problems from the point of view of different observers and explicitly performs
the necessary transformational operations. One such problem is the shape of a
moving electron, which is assumed to be a rigid sphere in a frame of reference
in which it is at rest, and the related problem of transforming the equations
of motion of a moving charge. Another such problem is the investigation of
the relativistic Doppler effect by asking how a light source would appear to an
observer who is rapidly moving toward it.
All this is well-known, but it illustrates the main point one might want to
make from a genetic perspective. The relativistic concepts arise from a technical
competence of actively changing perspectives by reversible, operational trans-
formations between the view points of moving observers. But the decentration
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that results from those efforts is of a special kind, which is responsible for the
notorious difficulty of learning and teaching relativity theory. The change of
perspective between frames of references that is relevant here is almost never—
certainly not to Einstein—one that is subject to human experience. To be sure,
the empirical consequences of relativity theory have amply been confirmed and
even play a role in today’s practical life. Nevertheless, the operational trans-
formations that mediate between different frames of reference, to the extent
that relativistic implications become important, are entirely theoretical. They
are mental operations making use of conceptual and calculational means of
deduction. They arise from technical operations that are connected with the
manipulation of coordinate systems and coordinate transformations as well as
their imagined interpretations. Humans are terrestial observers moving slowly
about the surface of the earth. The laws of physics as they would appear to
an observer who is co-moving with a fast moving electron, or a canal ray or an
astrophysical object, are not subject to any direct experiential concretization.
Nor can we experience how a light source would look like if approached with
close to luminal velocities. The change of perspective and the cognitive effort
of coordinating causal processes viewed from different frames of reference are
mental operations mediated through specific mathematical representation.
On the other hand, the relevant transformations have to be carried out in an
exact and quantitative way. The results carry empirical significance and could
be confronted with observation and this is what eventually made the cognitive
restructuring inevitable. For Einstein, the relevant experimental context of
the early twentieth century involved the investigation of the dynamics of beta
and cathode rays, i.e. of fast moving electrons, as well as experiments, such as
Fizeau’s or Michelson’s, of measuring the velocity of light, and astronomical
effects like stellar aberration.
Another difficulty of transferring Piaget’s analysis of pre-classical and New-
tonian temporal concepts to the conceptual context of special relativity seems to
be implied by the use of phrases like “time of relativity” or “relativistic time.”
If the classical conception of time emerges from the operational co-ordination
of co-displacements or from the co-seriation of causal sequences of events, then
the analog of classical time in the relativistic context should no longer be called
“time.” What emerges from the efforts of co-ordination of physical processes
between frames of references moving relative to each other with velocities com-
parable to the limit speed of light is not a new concept of time. It is a new
conception and conceptual framework of spatio-temporal relations that is best
captured by a term that was not available to Einstein in 1905. An appropriate
term only emerged a few years later with Hermann Minkowski’s reinterpretation
of relativistic concepts in terms of a four-dimensional “world” in which spatial
and temporal relations are only projections of every individual observer, or in
Minkowski’s oft-quoted words:
The views on space and time which I wish to lay before you have
sprung from the soil of experimental physics. Therein lies their
strength. Their tendency is radical. Henceforth space by itself,
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and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows,
and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent
reality. (Minkowski, 1909, xiv)
Minowski’s “world” is nowadays called Minkowski spacetime, a four-dimensional
Riemannian manifold with a Minkowski metric. In Minkowski spacetime any
relative times and spaces appear as projections relative to an observer, as was
illustrated graphically in Fig. 3. It is Minkowski spacetime—the entire spa-
tiotemporal structure, not any ‘relative time’ or ‘time of relativity theory’—
which constitutes the invariant entity emerging from the coordination efforts
and allowing for the transformational operations of going back and forth at will
between the possible experiences of different inertial observers.
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